L91C - Defense Techniques (FW, IDS, IPS)

Defense Techniques

Firewall, Intrusion Detection Security Testing

Agenda

• Firewall Techniques

- Introduction
- Packet-Level FW
- Stateful Inspection FW
- Application Level (Proxy) FW
- Circuit Level FW
- DMZ

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- Cisco ACL's
- Intrusion Detection
- Security Testing

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Protect or Not Protect Your Network ?

• Unprotected network

- Security have to be implemented on each host
 - Single vulnerable host would violate whole the network security
- Administrative nightmare
 - In case of a huge number of machines running a mix of various versions of operating systems
- Therefore protect your internal network
 - Place a barrier at the borders of trusted, inside network
 At the so called perimeter towards the Internet

Firewall, IDS, v4

- Barrier provides a single point of access control
 Helps with system monitoring and simplifies management
- Such a barrier is called firewall (FW)



Firewall Barrier / Firewall Inside Network Outside Network Utside Network III III III Inside Network III Outgoing / Outbound Traffic 2005, DJ. Matter Linder

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Firewall Principles

- Inside network is trusted
- Outside network is potentially malicious
- All traffic from inside to outside and vice versa
 - Must pass through the firewall
- Only authorized traffic will be allowed to pass
 - What is authorized is defined by the network security policy of your company
- The firewall must be well protected
 - Immune to any kind of penetration
 - FW based on a trusted system with a secure operating system

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Firewall Limitations and Types

• Principle problems with any kind of FW

- If you want access from the outside you must let traffic in or you want access to the outside you must let traffic out
 - Open certain TCP/UDP ports, trust certain IP addresses
 - Malicious / unwanted traffic may disguise behind allowed traffic
- You must trust your internal network
 FW cannot project against internal threats
- FW cannot project against internal threats
 If the single entry point of FW is bypassed by any dial-in facilities
- (RAS) the firewall cannot provide protection

• Different types

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- Packet Level FW (Stateless)
- Stateful Inspection FW
- Application Level / Proxy FW
- Circuit Level FW (e.g. SOCKS)

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
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Packet Level Firewall



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Packet Level Firewall Usage

Can secure inside hosts against

- Unwanted traffic, simple attacks and certain DoS attacks

1

2

- E.g. ICMP echo request, ICMP redirect request, ICMP unreachable, not supported UDP/TCP ports, IP source routing, SYN flooding
- Can limit services inside hosts can get from the outside
- Can secure against IP spoofing
 - Source address of inbound traffic is checked against inside used IP addresses -> if yes then traffic is blocked
 Prevention technique
 - Source address of outbound traffic is checked if it contains inside used IP addresses -> if no then traffic is blocked
 Be a good Internet citizen

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Packet Level Firewall Usage

- Can filter IP private address range
 - 10.0.0.0, 172.16.0.0 172.31.255.255, 192.168.X.X
- Can filter IP loopback address - 127.X.X.X
- Can filter IP multicast address range
- Can filter IP experimental address range
- Can filter APIPA

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- (automatic private IP address) 169.254.x.x...used by Microsoft
- All these addresses
 - should not appear from the outside in the source address of a datagram
- Can block incoming TCP connections
 - Usual method: No TCP SYN flag allowed in inbound packets and hence avoid three-way handshake of TCP connection establishment from the outside network

E.g. Cisco's "established" keyword in ACL
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Packet Level Firewall Limitation 1 Most network communication responses are stimulated by requests - So we have to let in the responses in order to communicate - But forged packets which look like harmless responses are still let in In principle all packets which match the filter rule and are allowed will pass - Malicious packets may hide behind allowed TCP/UDP ports Very strict filter rules - May be an administrative nightmare and tend to be complex © 2005. D.I. Manfred Lindner Firewall, IDS, v4.6

Packet Level Firewall Limitation

Filter rules must often allow more than what is be necessary for a certain communication E.g. inside client want access to outside servers Think about the TCP client port range Often all TCP destination ports and all IP source addresses must be passed through to let TCP replies from servers in (scenario ##) Special attention to Cisco's "established" keyword in ACL There is no state management of a TCP session Just inbound TCP segments with SYN (only) set are blocked Inbound TCP segments with ACK set are let in (especially a problem with above mentioned case of scenario

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- · Ports are open permanently to allow inbound traffic
 - Security vulnerability
 - Not adequate with certain applications which dynamically negotiated port numbers

3

4

- IP Fragmentation
 - Can't check TCP/UDP ports in a fragmented IP datagram
 - So the decision is
 - Either drop such the packet or let it through
 - If you let it in then together a vulnerability problem may arise (TCP overwrite attack)
 - The first fragment will fulfill all rules but the second fragment uses on offset to override fields (e.g. TCP ports) of the first fragment
 - Fragments are reassembled at the destination host and hence a malicious packet will reached the host at a port which is not permitted to pass the firewall

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Packet Level Firewall Limitation

• Filtering UDP segments is a problem

- Because of stateless behavior of UDP requests/replies
- So very often the decision on a packet level FW is to block UDP traffic generally

• Some services can't be filtered at all

- Think about IPSec encrypted traffic
- Check of TCP/UDP ports in encrypted payload of an IP datagram is not even possible at the firewall

• Simple NAT

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- May provide similar security for certain scenarios

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Stateful (Inspection) Firewall

Stateful inspection

Provides state management additionally to basic function of a packet level firewall

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
- Remembers (the initiating) outbound traffic so only valid responses are let in
- Creates filter rules (or better exceptions) on demand
 - Dynamic ACL's are used
- Actually monitors the TCP connections and records the important TCP state values in a table
- Checks if all TCP fields are in the expected range
 - Sequence number
 - Acknowledgement number
 - Window field
- Mandatory part of "real" firewall boxes
- Like Checkpoint's FW1 or Cisco's PIX


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




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- E.g. HTTP Java Applet Blocking
- E.g. SIP, H.323, RTSP
- With such features a normal router can operate even up to the network application level

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Stateful (Inspection) Firewall

• Less problems with stateless UDP traffic

- Because such a FW can remember initiator and therefore can check corresponding fields (e.g. port numbers) in replies
- Usually done within certain time limits after initial UDP request was sent
- Note:

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even with this UDP leaves some security problems like UDP spoofing, UDP hijacking

• A real good stateful inspection firewall

 Operates on higher performance level than packet level firewalls or proxy firewalls

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- Provides failover techniques
 - Hot standby with uninterrupted operation that means standby FW knows the context / states of the active FW

Stateful (Inspection) Firewall Limitation

• Exposure of inside IP address

- Stateful inspection firewall does not change the IP address from inbound to outbound
- Still we trust some IP addresses
 - But who is the actual user?
 - Therefore we would need a kind of authentication system

• Therefore some firewall implemenations combine

- Proxy authentication and stateful FW together
- NAT (PAT) and stateful FW together

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Application Level / Proxy Firewall

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
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Application Level Firewall




- User authentication and authorization may be checked
 Can be done for both directions (inbound, outbound)
- Session state information is maintained
- Can do caching of information replies (e.g. HTTP proxy)
- Proxy appears
 - As endpoint for a certain application from both inside and outside
- Some Problems:
 - Relatively slow under full load
 - Support of new applications must be installed at the proxy (may be difficult under operation)
 - Single point of failure

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Circuit Level Firewall

Avoids complexity of application level FW

- A new application means a new proxy function in such a application level FW
- Method:
 - Just act as connection relay function on TCP or UDP layer but not on the application layer
 - "Shim layer" between application and transport layer
 - TCP/UDP connection request is signaled via out-band channel and after authentication is successfully performed the appropriate TCP/UDP connections (two) are established
 - After that TCP/UDP segments are just relayed without any examination of content
- Example:
 - SOCKS (RFC 1928, 1929 (Auth U/PW), 1961 (Auth GSS-API), 1508/1509 (GSS-API obs.), 2743/2744 (GSS-API act.)
 - usually port 1080 is used to reach the SOCKS server for the TCP/UDP setup channel

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
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
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



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
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




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


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


 Firewall Techniques Introduction Packet-Level FW Stateful Inspection FW Application Level (Proxy) FW 	
 – Packet-Level FW – Stateful Inspection FW 	
- Stateful Inspection FW	
·	
 Application Level (Proxy) FW 	
 – Circuit Level FW 	
– <u>DMZ</u>	
– Cisco ACL's	
 Intrusion Detection 	
 Security Testing 	

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L91C - Defense Techniques (FW, IDS, IPS)

DMZ	
• DMZ – <u>D</u> e- <u>M</u> ilit	tarized <u>Z</u> one
 Network area b 	petween two packet filter firewalls
	FW1 only allows traffic from outside to the servers called " <u>bastion hosts</u> ") and vice versa
address	es anything to forward from the global network unless the destination is your bastion host and refuses anything to forward to the global unless the source address is the bastion host
 Second firev versa 	vall FW2 only allows traffic from inside to the servers and vice
destination	es anything to forward from your internal network unless the on address is your bastion host and refuses anything to forward to rnal network unless the source address is the bastion host
 Separates external 	ernal and internal network
 Contains hosts 	s that provide
 External ser 	vices (e. g. web server, DNS) and
 Application g 	gateways for internal clients
 When bastions 	s hosts are compromised
 Traffic of interest 	ernal network cannot be sniffed
 Protection by 	y firewall F2
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Access Lists on Cisco Routers

Access Lists on Cisco Routers

Stateless (static ACL)

Stateless (static ACL)

Standard and extended access control lists (ACL's)

For IP, IPX, AppleTalk, MAC

Numbered

Named (since IOS 11.2)

Stateful (dynamic ACL)

Reflexive ACL's (since IOS 11.3)

IOS routers with "FW Feature Set"

Stateless/stateful like in basic IOS feature

Additionally more powerful stateful filtering

Context Based Access Control (CBAC)

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IP Access List Types

• Standard

 Filtering based on the source address of a IP datagram only

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• Extended

- Filtering based on several attributes
 - IP protocol type (e.g. tcp, udp, icmp, ospf, eigrp, ...)
 - IP source and IP destination address
 - TCP/UDP source and TCP/UDP destination port
 - ICMP and ICMP message type

•


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Numbered Access Lists

- 1 99 (IP standard)
- 100 199 (IP extended)
- 1300 1999 (IP standard second range)
- 2000 2699 (IP extended second range)
- 700 799 (MAC address filtering)
- 1100 1199 (MAC address extended filtering)

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IP Extended ACL				
	d syntax: ss-list-number {deny permit} protocol source source- ation destination-wildcard [log] [fragments]			
 Command parame – protocol 	eters:			
gre, icmp, igmp range from 0	ber of an Internet protocol. It can be one of the keywords eigrp, , igr, ip, ipinip, nos, ospf, pim, tcp, or udp, or an integer in the to 255 representing an Internet protocol number. To match any col (including ICMP, TCP and UDP) use the ip keyword,			
 source (same for 	r destination)			
received. The – Use a 32-b – Use the ke	e network or host from which the packet is being sent or re are three alternative ways to specify it: it quantity in four-part, dotted-decimal format. sword host source as an abbreviation of source source-wildcard with nask = 0.0.00 (means exactly match)			
- Use the an 255.255.25	y keyword as an abbreviation for a <i>source</i> and <i>source-wildcard</i> of 0.0.0.0 (5.255.	D		
 fragments (optior 				
	st entry applies to non-initial fragments (L3 information only) of ragment is either permitted or denied accordingly.			
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
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IP Extended ACL (cont.) Command syntax TCP/UDP: - access-list access-list-number {deny | permit} tcp | udp source sourcewildcard [operator [port]] destination destination-wildcard [operator [port] [established] [log] [fragments] • Command parameters: - operator (optional) Compares source or destination ports. Possible operands include It (less than), gt (greater than), eq (equal), neq (not equal), and range (inclusive range). If the operator is positioned after the source and source-wildcard, it must match the source port. If the operator is positioned after the destination and destination-wildcard, it must match the destination port. The range operator requires two port numbers. All other operators require one port number - port (optional) . The decimal number or name of a TCP or UDP port. A port number is a number from 0 to 65535. TCP and UDP port names are listed - established (optional) · For the TCP protocol only: Indicates an established connection. A match occurs if the TCP datagram has the ACK, FIN, PSH, RST, SYN or URG control bits set. The non-matching case is that of the initial TCP datagram to form a connection. 2005, D.I. Manfred Lindner Firewall, IDS, v4.6

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IP Extended ACL (cont.) Command syntax ICMP: - access-list access-list-number {deny | permit} icmp source sourcewildcard destination destination-wildcard [icmp-type [icmp-code] | icmpmessage] [log] [fragments] · Command parameters: - icmp-type (optional) ICMP packets can be filtered by ICMP message type. The type • is a number from 0 to 255. - icmp-code (optional) ICMP packets that are filtered by ICMP message type can also be filtered by the ICMP message code. The code is a number from 0 to 255. - icmp-message (optional) · ICMP packets can be filtered by an ICMP message type name or ICMP message type and code name © 2005, D.I. Manfred Lindner Firewall, IDS, v4.6

Applying an ACL on an interface 9. Command syntax: paccess-group {access-list-number | access-list-name} {in | out} 9. Command parameters: access-list-number Number of an access list. This is a decimal number from 1 to 199 or from 1 to 02 699. access-list-name Name of an IP access list as specified by an ip access-list command. 9. Thitres on inbound packets. aut bilters on outbound packets.

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Usage Conventions of Access Lists

• Creation:

- When creating numbered ACL's, new lines are appended to the end of the current list
 - Modification requires deleting the list and re-entering the entire list
 - Exception: if you want to add something to the current last entry
- Common TCP/UDP services and ICMP types are known by name
 - Values such as telnet, ftp/ftp-data and icmp-echo are valid. TCP/UDP ports can be a numeric port range rather than just a single value.
- There is an implicit "deny any" at the end of the list !!!

• Processing:

- ACL's are processed in top down order
 - When a match is found (either permit or deny), processing ends. Therefore the sequence of ACL entries is important.

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Example 1 for an IP Standard ACL

• Define access-list:

- rx(config)# access-list 1 permit 193.212.14.0 0.0.0.255
- rx(config)# access-list 1 permit 68.23.15.1 0.0.0.0 • That is the same as saying "access-list 1 permit host 68.23.15.1"
- rx(config)# access-list 1 deny any log
- Implicit "deny any" not seen at the end of the configured list but is there

access-list 1 deny any

Be careful

- In the moment you apply an access-list to an physical interface the router starts filtering
 - · If you have specified only deny statements so far then all traffic will be blocked on that interface. Maybe you are cut off while configuring the router from a remote-site e.g. via telnet
- ACL configuration verification:
 - rx# show ip access-list 1

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Example 1 for an IP Standard ACL

- Apply access list to an interface:
 - rx(config)# interface Ethernet 0
 - rx(config-if)# ip access-group 1 in (in for inbound direction)
 - rx(config)# interface Serial 0
- rx(config-if)# ip access-group 2 out (out for outbound direction)
- Inbound ACL's are applied on ALL packets, also those destined for the router
- Outbound ACL's are applied on packets that go through the router

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Example 2 for an IP Standard ACL

• Definition of the access-list:

- rx(config)# access-list 10 denv 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
- rx(config)# access-list 10 deny 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255
- rx(config)# access-list 10 deny 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255
- rx(config)# access-list 10 deny 224.0.0.0 31.255.255.255 log
- rx(config)# access-list 10 deny 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 log
- rx(config)# access-list 10 remark "IP Spoofing Prevention of own addresses"
- rx(config)# access-list 10 deny 128.15.0.0 0.255.255 log
- rx(config)# access-list 10 permit any
- Implicit "deny any" not seen at the end of the configured list but is there

access-list 10 deny any

- In this special case the end of the list will be never reached

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Example 3 for an IP Extended ACL

• Definition of the access-list:

- rx(config)# remark "IP Spoofing Prevention of own addresses"
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny ip 128.15.0.0 0.255.255 any
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny tcp any any range 135 139
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny udp any any range 135 139
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny tcp any any range 445
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny udp any any range 69 log
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny udp any any range 161 162 log
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny icmp any any host-redirect echo
- rx(config)# access-list 101 permit any any
- rx(config)# interface Serial 0
- rx(config-if)# ip access-group 101 in

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Example 4 for an IP Extended ACL

• How to use the fragment keyword in extended ACL?

- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny ip any host 1.1.1.1 fragments
- rx(config)# access-list 101 permit tcp any host 1.1.1.1 eq 80
- rx(config)# access-list 101 deny ip any any
- The first statement will match and deny only non-initial fragments destined for host 1.1.1.1.
- The second statement will match and permit only the remaining nonfragmented and initial fragments that are destined for host 1.1.1.1 TCP port 80.
- The third statement will deny all other traffic.

Note:

• If we want to block non-initial fragments for any TCP port 80 of host 1.1.1.1, we must block non-initial fragments for all TCP ports of this host

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Named Access Lists

Avoids numbering approach

- Deletion is possible
- Using indexes, arbitrary changes are possible

• Example:

- rx(config)# ip access-list standard MyFirstRule
- rx(config-std-nacl)# permit 193.212.14.0 0.0.0.255
- rx(config-std-nacl)# deny any log
- rx(config-std-nacl)# exit
- rx(config)# interface Ethernet 0
- rx(config-if)# ip access-group MyFirstRule in
- ACL configuration verification:
- rx# show ip access-list MyFirstRule
- You will see line numbers (10, 20, 30,) which are automatically be inserted by IOS

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Named Access Lists

To insert new entries

- Simply specify a new sequence number first and enter a normal entry (in the config-std-nacl mode or in the config-ext-nacl mode)

- rx(config-std-nacl)# 25 permit 195.210.23.0 0.0.0.255

To delete entry number 20

- rx(config-std-nacl)# no 20

To resequence

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- rx(config)# ip access-list resequence MyFirstRule 20 10 • Starting by line 20 and proceeding with numbering by 10
- Issue this command after inserting several new entries in order to resequence each line for further insertions Firewall, IDS, v4.6

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Other Enhanced Access Lists

- Dynamic ("Lock and Key")
 - Create specific temporary openings (dynamic ACL's) in response to a successful user authentication
 - Superseded by FW-Feature-Set "Proxy Authentication"
- Time-based
 - Conventional numbered or named ACL activated at a certain data/time and released at another specified date/time
- **Reflexive** (since IOS 11.3)
 - Create dynamic entries
 - Replacement for "established" keyword of conventional numbered or named ACL

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- Superseded by FW-Feature-Set "CABC"
- Context Based Access List (CBAC)

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Reflexive Access Lists

Reflexive

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- Creates state information of sessions and controls them
- Stateful inspection for TCP sessions
- This allows you to control TCP connections arriving on the un-trusted side of your router when the TCP connection was initiated from the trusted side of your router
- Works basically with two extended access lists for outgoing and incoming traffic
 - New keyword reflect (for outgoing)
 - Specifying of a TCP state-table by a name (for outgoing)
 - Specifying evaluation (=monitoring) of appropriate state table (for incoming
- Applying of the two filters at the corresponding interface

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Reflexive Access Lists

• Example

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- rx(config)# ip access-list extended Filterout
- rx(config-ext-nacl)# permit tcp 193.212.14.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23 reflect Telnet-Connection
- rx(config-ext-nacl)# deny any log
- rx(config-etx-nacl)# exit
- rx(config)# ip access-list extended *Filterin*
- rx(config-etx-nacl)# evaluate Telnet-Connections
- rx(config-etx-nacl)# exit
- rx(config)# interface serial 0
- rx(config-if)# ip access-group Filterout out
- rx(config-if)# ip access-group Filterin in

CBAC (Context Based Access Control)

 Intelligently filters TCP and UDP packets based on protocol session information with dynamic ACL's

Firewall IDS v4


- In principle can inspect traffic for sessions that originate on any interface of the router but most done for sessions which originate inside
- Inspects traffic that travels through the firewall to discover and manage <u>state information</u> for TCP and UDP sessions
- This state information is used to create temporary openings in the firewall's ACL's to allow return traffic and additional data connections for permissible sessions
- Detection and prevention of certain types of network attacks are possible
- such as SYN flooding.
- CBAC also inspects packet sequence numbers in TCP connections to see if they are within expected ranges and drops any suspicious packets.
- Additionally, CBAC can detect unusually high rates of new connections and issue alert messages
- CBAC inspection can help protect against certain denial of service (DoS) attacks involving fragmented IP packets


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
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
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 Idle-time Max inactivity time Default TCP: 3600 seconds (1 hour) 	
 Default TCP: 3600 seconds (1 hour) 	
 Default UDP: 30 seconds 	
-ip inspect tcp udp idle-time <s< td=""><td>sec></td></s<>	sec>
DNS-timeout	
 Max inactivity time for DNS session 	
 Default: 5 seconds 	

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- Default: 400

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Other Inspection Parameters (3)

ip inspect tcp max-incomplete host <number> block-time
 (minutes)
 – Allows only <number> simultaneous sessions to specified DA

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
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
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Audit Trail		
 Generates Syslog r 	inspect audit-trail nessages upon every CBAC event ip inspect alert-off lerts	
Router(config)#	<pre># logging on # logging 10.0.0.3 # ip inspect audit-trail # no ip inspect alert-off</pre>	
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L91C - Defense Techniques (FW, IDS, IPS)



Intrusion Detection

- Process of identifying and responding to malicious activities targeted against networks and its resources
- System that performs intrusion detection is called
 - Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
- Provides a level of protection beyond the normal firewall service
 - By securing the network not only against external but also against internal attacks


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- Normally a defense mechanism behind outer barrier
- Complements defense techniques like firewalls

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Intrusion Detection System

Base idea

- Sniffing the network traffic in real-time
- Comparing the current network activities with known attack forms (so called signatures)
- E.g. several TCP SYN segments from the same source IP address to the same destination IP address to several ports within a certain time interval (maybe a DoS attack)
- E.g. several TCP SYN segments from the different source IP addresses to the same destination IP address to several ports within a certain time interval (maybe a DDoS attack)
- Create an alarm when an attack is recognized
- Signatures need to be updated
- Compare it with normal virus scanner on host machines

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Intrusion Detection System

• Different types of signatures

- Atomic

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- A single packet is sufficient
- No history memory is necessary
- Compound
 - Several packets within certain period o time needs inspection to identify an attack
 - Needs history memory
 - Such a machine needs more performance and RAM to maintain state information of ongoing traffic

Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems (IDS / IPS)

Firewall, IDS, v4.6

• Network based

- Part of the network infrastructure
 - E.g. Dedicated machine
 - E.g. Part of a router / switch
- Host based

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- Part of the OS of a computer
- IDS informs network (security) administrator about attacks
- IPS additionally filters malicious packets in case of an attack
 - Optionally can sent TCP RST packets to end-points of TCP connections to terminate half-open sessions

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L91C - Defense Techniques (FW, IDS, IPS)

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Intrusion Detection Techniques	
 Anomaly-based (or profile-based) 	

2

- Network behavior is compared against description of anticipated or recorded legal behavior (profile / baseline)
- Intrusion is assumed when deviation between current network activity and profile is significant
- Uses statistical methods and AI techniques
- Advantages

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- · Capable of detecting novel attacks
- Disadvantages
 - Difficult to configure / train
 - E.g. What is the normal behavior?
 - E.g. People work not like machines, so deviation may vary strongly
 - Therefore often a high number of false alarms will be seen

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L91C - Defense Techniques (FW, IDS, IPS)

Intrusion Detection Techniques

• Protocol analysis

 The different protocol headers of a packet together we the corresponding data payload are analyzed in detail to detect any abnormal or suspicious usage of <u>header and</u> <u>data fields</u>

3

- E.g. data payload is not zero in a packet which should not have any data payload
- In principle like the already mentioned signature technique

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 But most signatures work on the protocol header fields only and do not include the data payload

Signature Types

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- Built-in signature
 - Contained in the base SW of the IDS
- Tuned signature
 - Allows changing of certain parameters of built-in signatures
- Custom signature

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- Allows adding of new signatures to the pool

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Some Signature Examples

- Attempt to connect from a reserved address

 IP source address not allowed
- DoS attack on a server
 - To many packets within a certain time period
- Illegal TCP flag combination
 - Bad versus known good flag combinations
- DNS buffer overflow attempt contained in the payload of an DNS query

Firewall IDS v4

Agenda

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• Firewall Techniques

- Introduction
- Packet-Level F
- Stateful Inspection FW
- Application Level (Proxy) FW
- Circuit Level FW
- DMZ

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
- Cisco ACL's
- Intrusion Detection
- Security Testing

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2

Tools

Network Mapper / Scanner


Nmap

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- www.insecure.org/nmap
- Sniffer / Packet Replayer
 - Packetyzer
 - www.networkchemistry.com/products/packetyzer/
 - www.packetyzer.com/forum/
- Firewall Mapper / Scanner
 - www.packetfactory.net/

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Infos

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- www.heise.de/security
- isc.sans.org
- www.cert.org
- www.packetstormsecurity.org/
- www.informationweek.com
 - www.informationweek.com/techcenters/security/
- www.searchsecurity.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.icsalabs.com (Cybertrust)
- and many others of course

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Virus and Hoax Infos Viruses - www.cert.org - www.symantec.com (Norton Antivirus) - www.mcafee.com - www.icsalab.com - www.virusbtn.com Hoaxes - kumite.com/myths - www.hoaxkill.com

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Diverses Ideen

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TCP Wrappers

- allow host based access control on connections
- tcpd replaces daemons from inetd
- listens at ports, accepts connections
- checks hosts. allow and hosts. deny files
 - log connection
 - perform double reverse lookups (prevent DNS/ spoofing attacks)

Firewall, IDS, v4.6

Firewall

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• Not the ultimate solution

- cannot deal satisfactorily with content
- vulnerable to inside attacks and covert channels
- potential performance bottlenecks
- when compromised, network is unprotected
- Security Strategies
 - least privilege
- only permissions that are necessary should be granted - defense in depth
- additional security installations should be present
 - controlled access
 - fail
 - safe
- · a failing firewall may not reduce security

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Filtering Routers

- Filtering Routers route packets between internal and external hosts
 - do it selectively
 - perform filtering
 - allow or block certain types of packets
- Screening procedure is based on
 - Protocol (whether the packet is a TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet)
 - IP source/ destination address
 - TCP or UDP source/ destination port
 - TCP flags
 - ICMP message type
 - interfaces where packets are arriving and leaving

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Packet Filter

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- Old ones might be vulnerable to spoofing
- Fragmented Datagrams
 - discarded when not enough information to apply filter
 - when first fragment contains enough information, remaining ones are passed unchecked
 - potential vulnerability
 - first fragment with innocent values
 - other fragments with non-zero offset rewrite these value with malicious ones
 - reassembled fragment is delivered to protected service

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Packet Filter

Advantages

- easy to implement (relies on existing hardware)
- good performance
- Limits
 - limited auditing
 - difficult to configure
 - not very flexible, extensible
- Linux

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– iptables , ipchains

Stateful Inspection

• acts as a packet filter

- but accesses higher- level protocol information
 - check also content of packet / deny on match (e. g. virus)

Firewall, IDS, v4

- allows to track sessions (e. g. ftp, http)
- virtual sessions for connection- less protocols (e. g. UDP)
- firewall stores ports used in a particular UDP transaction
- temporarily creates an exception to let the answer pass through
- Checkpoint firewall

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Circuit Level Gateway

- Not only checks packets, but sessions / connections
 - based on user / password (e. g. first telnet to gateway, then telnet to the outside)
 - time of day

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• all traffic is disallowed, only validated sessions may transfer data

Firewall, IDS, v4.6

- do not need to be aware of the protocol
- cannot perform application- level filtering

IDS and firewalls

- Firewalls and IDS will eventually be combined into a single capability
 - Many firewalls can trigger alerts when traffic to "bad destination" is seen
 - This capability can be used to build "burglar alarms"
- A burglar alarm is a misuse detection system that is carefully targeted
 - You may not care about people port- scanning your firewall from the outside, but this information is important if it is happening from the inside.
 - Trivial burglar alarms can be built using tcpdump and perl

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Firewall, IDS, v4.6